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Abstract 
 
The thesis that the modality of nature is irreducibly dispositional or tenden-
tial in character is associated with ancient and medieval philosophy but has 
returned to contemporary metaphysics. Causes dispose towards their effects 
in a way that is less than necessary but more than purely contingent. This 
theory of dispositional modality can be distinguished from the contingent 
necessity view, the latter which seems to be the considered view of some oth-
ers who use the language of tendencies. The argument for treating such cases 
as conditional necessity does not look compelling prima facie, however, and a 
recent challenge to this conclusion is addressed. One argument for accepting 
the dispositional modality is that it can be experienced. Another is its explan-
atory power, which is then outlined in relation to metaphysics, action theory, 
ethics, epistemology and logic. The powers view, if it embraces the disposi-
tional modality, is potentially as powerful explanatorily as Lewis’s plurality of 
worlds, though without the disadvantage that those worlds are epistemically 
inaccessible. 
 
 
PART ONE: THE DISPOSITIONAL MODALITY 
 
1. The central claim 
 
A thesis associated more with ancient and medieval philosophy 
than modern is that the modality of nature is irreducibly disposi-
tional or tendential in character. Causes tend – but no more than 
tend – towards their effects. In many cases they succeed in produc-
ing them, when the disposition is manifested. They never necessi-
tate their effects but nor does nature consist of a mosaic of uncon-
nected objects, as Hume argued (Hume 1739 and Lewis 1986a: ix). 
This idea of there being an irreducible dispositional modality 
in nature was associated with Aristotle and Aquinas but has been 
revived in recent contemporary metaphysics (see Mumford and 
Anjum 2011a, 2011b). The core idea is that the modality of causa-
tion is the dispositional modality, connecting a causal power with 
its manifestation, where the dispositional modality is neither pure 
necessity nor pure contingency but something in between. This 
modality is sui generis and can come in various strengths. A dispo-
sition or power can tend towards an effect with a greater or lesser 
degree. While it admits a range of magnitudes, however, it would 
cease being the dispositional modality if it was so strong that it 
reached necessity. And where we have complete contingency, then 
we should say there is no tendency or disposition there at all. 
A gene may dispose towards the development of a certain 
phenotype, for instance, or the dropping of a glass dispose towards 
its breaking. For it to be a real disposition, the connection between 
the dropping and the breaking – or between the gene and the phe-
notypic trait – has to be more than the complete contingency that 
Hume described. Where we have a disposition, there is a connec-
tion in the world that is more than ‘loose and separate’. This dis-
poses or tends towards an outcome of a distinct type, of all those 
outcomes that might be logically possible. Hence, when the glass is 
dropped, it ‘might’ in some purely logical sense evaporate, explode, 
turn into a pig, grow wings and fly. But there is no natural disposi-
tion towards any of these things. Rather, the glass is disposed to 
break. 
But the glass is not bound to break, as some anti-Humeans 
would suggest (Ellis 2001, Bird 2007). Clearly, some dropped glasses 
don’t break and some genes fail to manifest their associated pheno-
type. Things can go wrong in nature or get in the way. There can be 
interferers or preventers for any natural process. Hume (1739: 161) 
himself suggested that his opponents believed in necessities in na-
ture but they needn’t do so. It is not as if a straight choice is to be 
made between Humean contingency and strict necessity. The dis-
positional modality is a third option and, as we have developed the 
account elsewhere (2011a, ch. 8), the one true worldly modality for 
describing an active, empowered nature. 
 
This may sound good in theory, but why should anyone believe 
that this is the one true modality? There are two main reasons. The 
first is an argument from acquaintance. It is claimed (Mumford and 
Anjum 2011a: ch. 9) that we have direct experiential knowledge of 
the dispositional modality through being causally engaged with the 
world. We are causal agents and patients, and contrary to Hume’s 
flawed volitional account of agency, we acquire knowledge of cau-
sation and its dispositional modality when we act and are acted 
upon. We will not repeat the details of the argument here but in-
stead will concentrate on the second, less direct argument. 
The second reason to accept the reality of this dispositional 
modality is its explanatory power, which we largely present in Part 
Two. This is a similar argument to Lewis’s for the existence of a 
plurality of other concrete worlds (Lewis, 1986b). The argument is 
from their explanatory power. Lewis alleges that if we posit such 
concrete worlds then so many problems of philosophy are ex-
plained: causation, laws, counterfactuals, properties, and so on. 
Now that may be so. Positing such worlds might produce an expla-
nation of all those things. But that still would not convince us to 
accept such an account if there are other ways of explaining such 
phenomena at least as well. Lewis’s explanation is a unifying one, 
of course, but perhaps there is another explanation that is just as 
powerful and is also unified. This, we claim, is the case for the met-
aphysics of powers and its accompanying dispositional modality. 
Of course, it might be argued that the best we can do is to of-
fer an equally powerful metaphysics to that of Lewis. It then might 
be a stalemate, with nothing to choose between these two rival 
metaphysics. But this would be where the first argument for pow-
ers could be brought back into the reckoning. There is no adequate 
modal epistemology, for Lewis’s theory. As worlds are spatiotem-
porally and thus causally discontinuous from each other, we have 
no way of knowing – for instance, perceiving – what is the case in 
other worlds: nor indeed any independent experiential evidence 
for their existence. The argument for them is purely in their ex-
planatory power. But in the case of causal powers and their dispo-
sitional modality, we have argued that these are also known direct-
ly through experience. This combination, of explanatory power 
and empirical evidence in their favour, makes for a persuasive 
case. 
While Part Two will illustrate some of the explanatory poten-
tial of the account, we feel we also have to do a bit more work to 
outline the theory of the dispositional modality and why we should 
accept it. This occupies the remainder of Part One. We will first 
consider some of the historical sources. Certainly this view has 
been attributed to others but we will see that they did not all have 
a clear irreducible modality of tendency in mind. We will show how 
the dispositional modality differs significantly from a conditional 
necessity account, which might resemble it superficially. We will 
then answer one recent objection to the dispositional modality ac-
count as this gives a good flavour of the issues under debate. 
 
 
2. Historical precedents and conditional necessity 
 
There are some alleged precursors to the dispositional modality. 
The view that the world contains tendencies that dispose, and no 
more than dispose, towards their manifestations is arguably to be 
found in Aristotle, Aquinas, Geach, Harré and Madden, Bhaskar and 
Cartwright. We will not be offering a comprehensive historical sur-
vey here, which deserves a dedicated study elsewhere. But we will 
mention one recent strand of thinking that has come into analytic 
philosophy via Geach’s interpretation of Aquinas. We will show 
how this has been understood in a way that is possibly not entirely 
consistent with a claim of dispositional modality. Indeed, we will 
argue that there is a rival conditional necessity view that is differ-
ent from dispositional modality. 
The contemporary source is Geach’s chapter on Aquinas’s 
philosophy of nature where the Thomistic account attributes 
tendencies towards certain outcomes that fall short of necessity 
(Geach 1961: 101f). An example is given to illustrate the tendency 
view. A heater is switched on in a room which tends towards its 
heating but doesn’t necessitate it. Indeed, at the same time an air 
conditioner is also turned on that counteracts the effect of the 
heater. Thus, the power of the heater is being exercised and is 
tending towards an effect but one that is not being realised. The 
same can be said from the point of view of the air conditioning sys-
tem. It is tending towards the cooling of the room but its effect also 
cannot be realised. We have, thus, a simple case of mutual interfer-
ence between two oppositely disposed powers. From this Geach 
concludes, rightly in our view, that powers cannot necessitate their 
effects, even when they are in the right conditions for their exer-
cise. And, as we argued elsewhere (Mumford and Anjum 2011a: ch. 
3), if powers do not necessitate their effects in cases where they are 
prevented from doing so, then they did not necessitate their effects 
even in the cases where they succeeded in producing them because 
there was always the possibility of prevention and interference, 
even if it did not happen as a matter of fact. Instead, then, we 
should think of those powers as tending, and no more than tend-
ing, towards their effects. 
Whether Geach is right to attribute this view to Aquinas is 
moot. Geach gives no textual evidence at all to support his inter-
pretation and this is work that ought now to be done. In particular, 
there are two ways of understanding these cases: as dispositional 
modality or as conditional necessity, two views we will distinguish 
shortly. Whether Geach’s attribution was correct or well-
documented, we nevertheless think that as a philosophy of nature 
it has much to recommend it. And it should also be said that it has 
proven influential. 
Harré and Madden (1975: 98-100) argue for a tendency ac-
count, for instance, and follow Geach in attributing the view to 
Aquinas but cite no more evidence than Geach does. They say that 
they prefer the term ‘power’ over ‘tendency’ because they see the 
latter as suggesting passivity. There is a reason to have some scep-
ticism that Harré and Madden were firmly wedded to a genuinely 
tendential view of nature, consistent with the dispositional modali-
ty, because they subtitle their book A Theory of Natural Necessity. 
The idea that powers irreducibly tend towards their manifestations 
says, on the contrary, that dispositional modality is neither com-
plete contingency nor necessity. Dispositionality is not reducible to 
either. It is dispositionality that is the primary modality of nature, 
on this view. 
This distinction between a commitment to a genuine disposi-
tional modality and what can be called a conditional necessity view 
can be brought out into the open if we consider the more detailed 
statements in Bhaskar (1975). Bhaskar speaks of tendencies as con-
stituting the generative mechanisms of causal laws, where those 
tendencies can act transfactually, underlying and generating the 
occurring events. However, it is not obvious that tendency consti-
tutes an irreducible dispositional modality in this view. A first clue 
is that, like Harré and Madden, Bhaskar uses the explicit language 
of natural necessity to contrast his view of science with Hume’s (see 
e.g. Bhaskar 1975: 14 & ch. 3.3). And this does not seem to be a 
mere slip or unintended implication but much of what Bhaskar 
says there indicates a necessity view of nature or at least condi-
tional necessity.  
Certainly, Bhaskar’s tendencies may be exercised without be-
ing manifest in any outcome (1975: 14) but he also says that they 
nevertheless provide an ontological basis for ‘necessity in nature’ 
(1975: 14). Tendencies are potentialities that can be in play without 
being realised or manifest in an outcome and, crucially, ‘It is the 
idea of continuing activity as distinct from that of enduring power  
that the concept of tendency is designed to capture.’ (1975: 50) So it 
is not tendency as irreducible sui generis modality that it is the 
point: it is the idea of continuing activity, possibly without mani-
festation (which is what Bhaskar means by transfactual). 
When we get explicit statements specifically on the modality 
that tendencies bring, Bhaskar consistently lapses back into talk of 
necessity and seems to mean it seriously. For example: ‘there must 
be a reason why, once a tendency is set in motion, it is not fulfilled. 
… Once a tendency is set in motion it is fulfilled unless it is pre-
vented.’ (Bhaskar 1975: 98) So if undisturbed, the generative mech-
anism would result in the tendency’s manifestation.  
Later, he adds: ‘When such tendencies are realized the events 
describing the stimulus or releasing conditions for the exercise of 
the tendency and its realization may be said to be necessarily con-
nected’ (1975: 214), which is followed by a concrete example: ‘If a 
thing is a stick of gelignite it must explode if certain conditions 
materialize. Since anything that did not explode in those circum-
stances would not be a stick of gelignite but some other substance.’ 
(1975: 214)  
This suggests that there are various natural necessities that 
are able to cut across each other but, where conditions are propi-
tious, it is necessary that they exercise: and they so exercise even if 
they are ‘unfulfilled’ or unmanifested due to a countervailing ten-
dency also operating. The latter feature is certainly a part of the 
Mumford-Anjum account: in equilibrium cases, for instance. But 
the idea of the irreducible sui generis dispositional modality does 
not seem to be a feature of Bhaskar’s account. He may of course be 
insensitive to the distinction we are trying to draw, or he may just 
be failing to express adequately and clearly his view, but many 
times he invokes necessity in the cases where the conditions are 
conducive to manifestation. His tendencies might not always be in 
the right conditions to have their effects: but where they are, those 
effects are necessitated. 
It should be clear by now that we are not persuaded by this 
rival reading of the natural modality: the conditional necessity 
view. One very simple reason is the coherence of a notion of condi-
tional necessity. The very idea of necessity seems to mean uncondi-
tional, as Mill (1843: III, v, 6) emphasised. Certainly as necessity is 
understood philosophically, then if A necessitates B, B should occur 
whenever A occurs. If switching on the heater necessitates the 
warming of the room, then it should do so whenever it is switched 
on. But we have seen that there are conditions in which it will not 
do so: when an air conditioner is also operating. So in what sense is 
there necessity here? And a second challenge to the coherence of 
the notion is that if we allow necessity to be conditional – some-
thing that operates when all the conditions are right – then every 
truth will turn out to be likewise necessary, destroying any distinc-
tion between contingent and necessary truths. One might think 
that a particular door being white is a contingent truth because it 
could have been otherwise. But no doubt there were conditions as-
sembled that led to it being white. Would that count as conditional 
necessity, once those conditions came to be realised? What would 
then remain contingent? 
There is a final reason we are sceptical about the conditional 
necessity view, which is that no sound argument is advanced in its 
favour. Bhaskar’s argument contains a clear elision from it being 
necessary that kind-k members have tendency T to manifest m, as 
part of the essence of k-membership, to it being necessary that k’s 
tendency T manifests m. We see this in Bhaskar where immediately 
before his gelignite example, quoted above, he says: ‘a thing must 
tend to act the way it does if it is to be the kind of thing it is.’ We 
have no quarrel with this claim, which is standard in dispositional 
essentialism (Ellis and Lierse 1994). It says that it is a necessary 
condition of being a member of kind-k that something has tenden-
cy T. But one cannot at all infer from this, as Bhaskar does in the 
very next sentence (quoted above) that those kind members must 
of necessity manifest those tendencies (when conditions are right).  
While Bhaskar may be confused between two options, Anna 
Marmodoro (forthcoming) explicitly recommends a conditional 
necessity view of causal powers and furthermore suggests that it 
was Aristotle’s own view. It is arguable, however, that the original 
sources are ambiguous between a conditional necessity and dispo-
sitional modality interpretation. The sort of text in question is the 
following, for instance: 
 
 
[a thing] has the potentiality in question when the passive object is 
present and is in a certain state; if not it will not be able to act. To 
add the qualification ‘if nothing external prevents it’ is not further 
necessary; for it has the potentiality . . . on certain conditions, 
among which will be the exclusion of external hindrances; for 
these are barred by some of the positive qualifications [for the po-
tentiality in question]. (Aristotle, Metaphysics IX.5, 1048a15-20) 
 
 
But this seems a form of words to which holders of both the 
conditional necessity and the dispositional modality views could 
consent. Marmodoro finds a notion of conditional or qualified ne-
cessity more plausible than do we, and endorses it accordingly. But 
whether it was Aristotle’s view may be an open question. It seems 
quite plausible that he was not sensitive to the distinction between 
these two accounts that we contend is important. To be completely 
clear: on the conditional necessity view, when a power is in all ‘the 
right conditions’ for its manifestation, assuming such a notion can 
be spelled out non-trivially, then the effect is necessitated. It has to 
happen. On the theory of dispositional modality, in contrast, when 
a power is in all the right conditions for its manifestation, it still 
‘only’ tends, and no more than tends, to produce its effect, where 
such tendencies can come in greater and lesser strengths. 
 
 
3. A challenge to the dispositional modality  
 
But why would anyone accept the latter view? Is there something 
unstable about the position? Doesn’t it violate the principle of suf-
ficient reason? While we do not intend to re-present all the argu-
ments for and against the dispositional modality here, we will in-
stead address a recent criticism voiced by John Heil (in conversa-
tion) that teases out a number of the issues. 
Heil suggests that without necessity, the link between a dis-
position and its manifestation becomes mysterious. In what sense 
can a power be ‘for’ its manifestation unless it necessitates it? We 
have argued that the possibility of an additive preventer under-
mines the case for this connection being one of necessity. If we 
have A and B, which usually produce C, but can fail to do so when 
accompanied by D, then A and B cannot necessitate C, even on the 
occasions where they do in fact produce C. Another way of stating 
the necessitarian claim is that A and B are sufficient for C. Yet how 
could they be if there are some occasions when they occur without 
C, due to the presence of D? We call this an argument from additive 
interference and (in our 2011a: ch. 3) we consider and reply to a 
number of objections to the argument. Heil’s objection is new. 
Heil’s diagnosis is that where A and B usually produce C, but 
when accompanied by D do not, the partnership of {A, B, D} is actu-
ally a new mutual manifestation partnership that produces a dif-
ferent manifestation E, where E ≠ C. And just as {A, B} necessitates 
C, so {A, B, D} necessitates E, Heil alleges. 
Our first response is to note that this does not appear to be 
the necessitation we usually find in philosophy: in logic, for in-
stance. There, if {A, B} necessitates C, so does {A, B, D} because it 
contains {A, B}. Thus {A, B} cannot necessitate C if {A, B, D} doesn’t 
also produce it, which Heil admits it doesn’t. Another way of look-
ing at this is to say that necessity admits monotonic reasoning, 
where inferences are not open to revision in the light of additional 
premises. So whatever is going on between a disposition and its 
manifestation, it cannot be quite what most philosophers mean by 
necessity. Perhaps it is a natural or metaphysical force rather than 
strict necessity. But this is what we think is the dispositional mo-
dality. And we think that it’s quite alright to explicate the way a 
disposition is ‘for’ a manifestation in this manner. Tending towards 
the manifestation seems a perfectly good way of understanding the 
meaning of being ‘for’. Tending towards doesn’t seem wholly myste-
rious, especially if it’s something in our experience. 
There is, however, a possible way out for Heil, which has been 
suggested to us by Olivier Massin (again in conversation). This ob-
jection makes use of another view for which we have argued, 
namely the possibility of emergent powers. The powers of a whole 
are not always the mere sum of the powers of the parts. This is be-
cause, among other reasons, powers might compose in a non-linear 
way. In that case, one cannot simply assume that the powers of the 
set {A, B, D} is simply the addition of the powers of A, B, and D. 
Each new set of powers could be thought of as an emergent whole 
that is not reducible to the powers of the parts. If that is the case, 
then our argument from additive interference seems inapplicable. 
{A, B} might indeed necessitate C, so it is alleged, but {A, B, D} need 
not because it has to be treated as a wholly distinct unit form {A, 
B}, rather than something that contains it.  
In the case of emergent powers, this is an implication that we 
grant can follow. However, we still do not accept that this allows 
Heil’s claim to go through. All it amounts to is an assertion of the 
very thesis we deny. Heil might assume that {A, B} necessitates C 
and {A, B, D} necessitates E, but there is no argument for that con-
clusion. It merely appeals to any pre-existing necessitarian inclina-
tions had by the listener. What we have done is offer a test of ne-
cessity that, we argue, is failed in cases of additive interference. 
The best that Heil can say, in a case where an added power consti-
tutes a new whole, is that our proposed test of necessity cannot be 
taken. We cannot conclude from the inability to apply a test that it 
is thereby passed. It might mean that we have to find another test 
but until that point we should not concede Heil’s counterargument. 
To summarise the position: there is a strong prima facie ar-
gument from the possibility of additive interference that suggests 
that powers do not necessitate their effects. Heil has challenged 
this argument but at most this challenge could show that there 
might be some cases where the test cannot be applied, which does 
not prove the case in favour of necessity. This of course does not 
prove in favour of the dispositional modality either. As we said at 
the start, however, there are two separate positive arguments in its 
favour. One concerned our perceptual experience as causal agents 
and patients (Mumford and Anjum 2011a: ch. 9), which is that we 
have direct experience that our actions tend in a certain direction 
but can be prevented: and likewise in the case of powers acting up-
on us. The second kind of argument was the explanatory work that 
can be done by the dispositional modality, and this is what will oc-
cupy us in Part Two. 
 
 
PART TWO: THE WORK THAT DISPOSITIONAL MODALITY CAN DO 
 
We come, then, to the explanatory argument for the dispositional 
modality. We will show the work the dispositional modality can do 
in a wide range of areas of philosophy. And it is not just the powers 
that do the explanatory work in these cases, but specifically the 
tendential dispositional modality. Thus, if one understood powers 
in terms of necessity, as some anti-Humeans are inclined to do, 
then the explanations offered here will not be possible. 
 
 
4. Metaphysics 
 
The central case that motivated the original considerations in fa-
vour of the dispositional modality was that of causation. Given the 
kind of prevention and additive interference examples already cit-
ed, then the best explanation seems to be that causes tend towards 
their effects and often succeed in producing them. Since the effects 
could have been prevented, then they were not necessitated by 
their causes. 
A feature that such a theory can explain is how general caus-
al truths are less than universal. It is widely accepted, for instance, 
that smoking tobacco causes cancer and yet there can be some who 
smoke without getting cancer. On a strict Popperian view (Popper 
1959) the existence of a long-standing smoker without cancer 
would constitute a falsification of the alleged causal connection. 
Yet it is remarkable how few would think so. A causal link between 
smoking and cancer is accepted to be perfectly consistent with 
there being exception cases. The best explanation of this, we sug-
gest, is that the smoking of tobacco is a factor that tends towards 
cancer in some degree: a degree that produces a statistical correla-
tion of a measurable proportion of smokers who get cancer. Simi-
larly, when we look at the causal role of genes in biology, there is 
ample empirical evidence (summarised in Mumford and Anjum 
2011a: ch. 10) of a distinct tendency towards certain phenotypes 
but not ones that develop in every case in which the relevant gene 
is possessed.  
A necessitarian about causation may well claim that both 
smokers and members of the genotype in question in reality divide 
into two classes and that all smokers of the right sub-kind get can-
cer and all with the right sub-genotype develop the related trait. 
But here there is some doubt that we can spell out the relevant 
sub-kind, such as ‘the right sub-kind of smoker’, in any non-trivial 
way that also secures the perfect correlation with cancer. We may 
have to make ever more refined divisions of sub-kinds until we 
have one that has only a few members (Russell 1913: 170). And 
what then would be left of the claim of necessity, with so few in-
stances? 
The tendential view thus takes us away from the need for 
regularities or constant conjunctions. This is appealing because it 
seems that they are won only through some artifice, rather than a 
phenomenon we regularly find in our natural encounters with 
causes. Constant conjunction is sometimes criticised by anti-
Humeans for being insufficient for causation, for the reasons we 
have just given, but for the dispositionalist, it is not even a neces-
sary condition. A necessitarian about powers will not agree with 
this conclusion, hence they have to join the Humeans in searching 
for constant conjunctions despite the prima facie data.  
Within metaphysics, there are clear extensions of the disposi-
tional modality to the related issues of laws of nature and probabili-
ties. Understanding laws as general causal statements, we note that 
they often need a ceteris paribus qualification in order to claim 
truth. We then have a problem of how to understand such CP-
clauses. Might such laws be still false, if they are meant to exclude 
a named factor? Or might they be rendered trivially true? Rather 
than those still problematic options, we follow Lipton (1999) in say-
ing that the CP-clause should be read dispositionally. And if we 
then take that as an explicit commitment to a sui generis disposi-
tional modality, then we have a non-trivial sense in which laws can 
be true. Being an F can dispose towards G, consistently with some-
thing being F and not-G because it is prevented from being so. The 
account is also a basis for a propensity interpretation of probabil-
ity. Because of the tending towards of outcomes, some will be more 
probable than others with the strength of the disposition deter-
mining the truth of probability. This is not to say that the tendency 
is itself probabilistic, which is a matter that would require further 
discussion. 
 
 
5. Action Theory 
 
Minds are capable of forming intentional states, directed towards 
intentional objects, subject to the possibility of intentional inexist-
ence. A naturalistic account of these abilities will almost certainly 
be in terms of the causal powers of agents, such as that attempted 
by Armstrong (1968: Pt. 2), for instance. If intentionality really is 
built on powers then we might expect some evidence of the dispo-
sitional modality at work. Indeed, this can be found. 
Hoping for F would have no point if F were thought to be a 
matter of necessity. Such a thought might be dismissed as a failure 
of rationality. One must hope for something that is not necessary. 
But in hoping for F, an agent has a more than merely contingent 
relation to F. There are other things, G, and H, that are also less 
than necessary but they might not be the things for which the 
agent hopes. So there is an intimate relation the agent bears to F 
that they do not bear to other possibilities.  
Similar things may be said of other intentional phenomena. 
One might intend to perform action Y, for example. Again, to do so 
is rationally an acknowledgment that Y is not a matter of necessity. 
But in intending to Y, Y becomes more than a mere possibility for 
that agent, among all the many others. The agent selects Y from 
the other possibilities in front of them and commits to its perfor-
mance. Committing to a performance clearly cannot guarantee it is 
carried through, though, as there are obvious cases where our in-
tentions go awry and we fail to perform those actions. 
There seems to be, then, a special connection that intentional 
beings hold to their ‘objects’. Some say they are directed towards 
them. There are similarities between this notion of directedness 
and dispositionality. Both Place (1996) and Molnar (2003: ch. 3) 
have explained the similarity by offering an intentional account of 
dispositions, claiming that intentionality is the mark of the disposi-
tional. We see things the other way around. It is the dispositional 
modality of powers that explains intentionality, rather than vice 
versa, and intentionality thus inherits the modality of those pow-
ers. Wherever there are intentional states, we expect to find some 
connection with the agent that is less than necessary but more 
than purely contingent. One picks out some state of affairs, F, for 
instance, towards which one bears a more than purely contingent 
connection: it is what one hopes or wishes for, fears, intends, be-
lieves, perceives, and so on, but it is less than necessary that one 
does so. No doubt, there will be widely differing accounts of the 
various types of intentionality and their objects. It is possible – in-
deed desired – that one believes necessary truths, but clearly it is 
not necessary that one does so. The core position, however, is that 
any naturalised account of intentionality, built on causal powers, 
will exhibit its dispositional modality.  
A consideration of action theory in the special subject of phi-
losophy of sport also brings a useful application of the dispositional 
modality. In sports, we measure prowess, such as strength, stamina 
and skill. These are all causal powers, which we measure through 
their comparative manifestations: who can lift the heaviest weight, 
jump the highest, score the most goals, and so on. Each player or 
team seeks to manifest their sporting prowess to a level sufficient 
to beat their opponents. 
The stronger team tends to win but need not always do so 
(Mumford and Anjum 2014b). The dispositional modality is abso-
lutely vital to these sporting contests. We premise our participa-
tion and our spectatorship on such a tendential view. If the strong-
er team was bound to win, there would be no point playing or 
watching. Nothing their opponents did could alter the inevitable. 
Nor would the stronger team have any motivation to try hard. 
Greater causal power cannot guarantee success, though. But if the 
result were an entirely contingent matter, a pure chance, then 
sport would have no point either. Again, there would be no point 
training, preparing, striving and trying. And nor would a game of 
pure chance make for an interesting spectator experience. The ob-
vious way to interpret sporting contests, therefore, is that each 
participant or team aims to manifest their sporting prowess to its 
maximum extent, or enough to secure success, where the exercise 
of each prowess is a tendency towards victory. And perhaps there 
are some sporting liabilities, too, that are tendencies towards de-
feat, which the participants seeks not to manifest. These prowesses 
do not guarantee their outcomes but they have a purpose and role 
because they have a tendency towards them. The stronger teams 
tend to beat the weaker ones. They don’t always, and thus sport 
retains some interest for spectators and is worth the effort for the 
participants. It thus appears that the whole of sport is premised on 
the dispositional modality being in play. 
But to see this is also to approach one of the biggest pay-offs 
of all from the theory of dispositional modality. The account has 
the potential to offer a solution to the philosophical problem of free 
will. There have already been a number of attempts to carve out 
space for a libertarian solution based on the metaphysics of powers 
(O’Connor 2000, Steward 2012, Groff 2013: ch. 5, Lowe 2013, and Vi-
hvelin 2013). Thus far, however, these accounts have not made use 
of the dispositional modality of powers. 
The problem of free will can be articulated in terms of two 
principles. Both seem needed to get us free will yet it might look as 
if one of them can be gained only at the expense of the other: 
 
 
The Principle of Alternate Possibilities (AP): we could have acted oth-
erwise. 
 
 
And: 
  
 
The Principle of Ultimate Authorship (UA): we are the ultimate authors 
of our own actions and decisions. 
 
 
It looks as if AP, alternate possibilities, can be gained only 
through rejecting determinism; that is, by allowing some indeter-
minism into the world. But if one does that, it seems as if UA, ulti-
mate authorship, is undermined. One does not want to be in the 
grip of determinism’s necessity but nor does one want to be the 
slave of pure chance. Determinism threatens free will because it 
makes AP look impossible; but indeterminism also threatens free 
will because it makes UA look impossible.  
However, in being empowered, we are causal agents whose 
actions will tend towards the production of certain outcomes. If we 
intend and achieve those outcomes, it is right that we have respon-
sibility for them, even though it was possible that they could have 
been prevented. We retain ultimate authorship of what we do even 
though we cannot guarantee its successful performance. Why 
should we need to? Again, causes are rightly taken to be responsi-
ble for their effects even though they don’t guarantee them. Pro-
ducing them is enough. And the account works both ways. Similar-
ly, the causes that act upon us, in respect of which we are patients, 
will only dispose towards having effects on us. We are capable of 
interfering with and preventing them, even though they will tend 
us in a certain direction to a greater or lesser degree. A commit-
ment to the dispositional modality gives us libertarianism, there-
fore: free will as constituted by us having both AP and UA, secured 
as a pair through the dispositional modality. 
 
 
6. Ethics 
 
Much in the ethics of responsibility flows from this account of free 
will. If all was necessitated, it is hard to see how we can have genu-
ine responsibility. The intuition is favour of incompatibilism be-
tween free will and determinism is thus largely right (Mumford 
and Anjum 2014a). But if all is purely contingent, including the 
connection between our intentions and our actions, and between 
our actions and their effects, then how can we have responsibility 
either? Needless to say, given the prior discussions concerning in-
tentionality and free will, we propose to solve this dilemma in 
terms of the dispositional modality. It is neither the case that 
events are necessary nor purely contingent. We have responsibility 
for those outcomes we cause through our intentional actions. 
On a wider ethical issue, however, the dispositional modality 
also offers something vital in the case of normativity generally. We 
argue that it invokes the dispositional modality and thus that all of 
us who make normative claims are adept at invoking a tendential 
view (Anjum, Lie and Mumford 2013). 
Hence, we ought to be truthful, some might say, but this does 
not necessitate that everyone, not even that anyone, is. Lies still 
occur. The norm does not determine the case, therefore. Indeed, 
one could say that a norm is redundant if its object is a matter of 
necessity. No one says that one ought to be subject to gravity. But 
the normative statement, that one ought to be truthful, says more 
than that truthfulness is just one possibility among many others. 
Normative statements instead identify a subset of all the possibili-
ties as those an agent ought or ought not to perform. When one 
ought to do something, therefore, it is less than necessary but 
more than purely contingent that one does so. We can think of 
normativity as a selection function (Mumford and Anjum 2011a: 
189). Of all the acts possible, this function selects a subset of them, 
saying that these are the ones towards which one should aim. In-
tentionality similarly employs some form of selection function. In 
the case of hope, a subset of all the future possibilities is selected as 
desired. In the case of belief, a subset of all the possible statements 
or propositions is selected to be believed, and so on. 
Normativity and responsibility are not the only notions cru-
cial to ethics in which the dispositional modality is involved. Oth-
ers concern our agency, as already discussed. Normativity alone, 
however, if it depends upon the dispositional modality, is enough 
to show that this sui generis modality has valuable work to do in 
ethics. And given that we use normative notions with such fre-
quency, seemingly with relative ease, it suggests that we all have a 
good sense of what this modality is.  
 
 
7. Epistemology 
 
If the world really is full of this dispositional modality, everywhere 
from causation to free will, ethics and sport, one might expect that 
our epistemological practices take it into account. When we act, for 
instance, we might be expected to do so in the knowledge that 
causes can sometimes fail to produce their desired effect. When we 
make predictions, they ought to be based on this modality, as 
should our inductive inferences. 
 
There is enough evidence to believe that this is indeed the case. We 
do not offer a full theory of prediction here but are in a position to 
explain something crucial about it: an issue frequently overlooked 
or ignored. Even our best predictions are sometimes disappointed. 
Good predictions are on the whole reliable but we can never know 
for sure that they will come to be true, if the concern is with natu-
ral causal processes, which they all ought to be. Predictions are de-
feasible. We know this when we make them. An explanation of this 
is that we predict on the basis of what tends to be the case, given 
consideration of a number of factors. Occasionally our prediction is 
disappointed through involvement of some further factor that was 
not included in our modelling: in other words, an additive interfer-
er. Hence, even in computer simulation, the basis for some of our 
best predictions, we have to include a finite number of factors. Ef-
fectively we create an artificial closed system within the model. 
The real world should be thought of instead as an open system in 
which new factors can enter, preventing some outcome that was 
previously expected. 
Nevertheless, although we know that our predictions lack 
certainty, and are sometimes disappointed, if their truth were a 
matter of complete contingency, then they would have no use. If 
literally anything could happen at any time, with equal probability, 
then prediction would be a redundant activity. But we predict in-
stead what tends to be the case, with more or less reliability: some-
times where those predictions come accompanied by the assess-
ment of reliability, for instance, that there is an 80 percent chance 
of rain in the city tomorrow. Again, in making predictions, with the 
acceptance that they are defeasible, it suggests that we all have 
quite a good grasp of the dispositional modality: both how to in-
voke it and how to understand it. 
This also feeds into our inductive inferences and suggests that 
the dispositionalist ought to rule that there is no problem of induc-
tion, as classically understood. Instead, we say that induction is 
thought only to be a problem on the unwarranted grounds that 
there are causal truths that can guarantee whenever A, then B. No 
natural process ever guarantees that so we should not be seeking a 
form of inductive inference that predicts B whenever A. Some time 
ago, Strawson (1952: ch. 9) suggested that we should not hope for 
inductive inferences to deliver the same certainty as deductive in-
ferences. Now we see why not. Causation itself does not work 
through necessity and our best inductive inferences are precisely 
as insecure as they ought to be. Thus, just as A and B cannot neces-
sitate C, because they might be accompanied by the preventer D, so 
should we not seek any inductive inference from A and B to C with 
certainty. C will never be certain because A and B ‘only’ tend to-
wards it. The only secure inferences like this would not properly be 
inductive, for instance that all men are mortal, which is a classifi-
catory truth rather than an inductive one. Overall, where we have 
an entire uniformity of nature, for instance, that all electrons are 
negatively charged, then we should take it as prima facie evidence 
that something other than causation is involved, and that some-
thing other than induction is its source: for instance, that we have 
a truth of essence. 
With this understanding of nature, we are in a better position 
to make decisions for action, hence the dispositional modality con-
tributes to decision theory. We make our decisions on the basis of 
our knowledge of the relevant dispositions in operation and how 
they combine, either in some linear or nonlinear fashion. We de-
cide our actions on the basis that they tend towards production of 
a desired result, always with the awareness that an action can fail 
to deliver it. Where there is a failure, we either try again or correct 
the background conditions that have prevented the intended con-
sequence, all showing complete mastery of the dispositional mo-
dality. 
 
 
8. Logic 
 
If one accepts the dispositional modality, there are a number of 
implications in relation to logic and language, but which all sit sen-
sibly as solutions to some long-standing questions. For example, 
there are a variety of uses for conditionals one of which concerns 
what can be called an ‘ordinary causal conditional’ (Austin 1956: 
209-10), or ‘proper conditional’ (Lowe 1995: 50). This would be 
where we invoke some kind of natural causal link between ante-
cedent and consequent: so we will use the term natural condition-
al. 
 
Contextualists accept that there are always circumstances in 
which a natural conditional is false, which raises again the issue of 
ceteris paribus qualifications. Nevertheless, although some condi-
tions might render a natural conditional claim false, we are still 
able to use such conditionals because, we claim, of our grasp of the 
dispositional modality. Thus, the conditionals ‘if an iron bar is 
heated, it expands’, ‘if this match is struck, it lights’ and ‘if the 
news gets out, there will be panic’ can all be asserted in certain 
contexts in which they have truth. Nevertheless, any such condi-
tional can also be false in some circumstance, which is usually ac-
cepted tacitly. The match won’t light when stuck, if there is also a 
gale; and there won’t be panic when the news gets out, if accompa-
nied by reassurances. Nevertheless, the assertion of a conditional is 
still useful as a linguistic tool because it is asserted while deploying 
the dispositional modality. We assent to some conditional such as 
‘if this match is struck, it lights’ precisely because we know that 
striking matches is the way to get them to light. It cannot guaran-
tee that result, certainly, but the antecedent conditions bear a 
more than completely contingent connection to the consequent 
conditions. Thus, we can invoke natural conditionals meaningfully 
while at the same time acknowledging the truth of contextualism. 
What we claim here need not be true of conditionals alone but is 
the basis for a dispositional understanding of language and meaning 
generally (Mumford and Anjum 2011c). All utterances will tend to-
wards a core meaning but one that is variable and sensitive to con-
text. 
It follows from this that no conditional analysis of disposi-
tions is possible, as many continue to believe (for example Gunder-
son 2002, Choi 2008). Natural conditionals of this kind are to be un-
derstood dispositionally and so cannot be the basis of an analysis of 
dispositionality. A conditional analysis of fragility, for instance, in-
to ‘if dropped, then broken’ will be false in some context. We might 
try to build that context into the antecedent but there will always 
be some further possible context in which even that strengthened 
conditional could be false. Alternatively, we might try to capture 
all those conditions in a way that guarantees the truth of the con-
sequent but it is hard to believe that this can be done non-trivially. 
The best account, as we have now suggested, is that this condition-
al be itself understood as invoking the dispositional modality. The 
dropping of fragile things tends to break them, where such tending 
is the sui generis modality of dispositionality. If the conditional has 
to appeal to this irreducible dispositional connection between an-
tecedent and consequent, then in no way can it be used in an anal-
ysis of dispositions. On the contrary, it seems that a proper account 
of conditionals cannot be given without dispositions. 
We might finally conclude that the realist about the disposi-
tional is to be wholly unsympathetic to any purely extensional sys-
tem of logic. Carnap (1936) and others attempted to reduce disposi-
tions away using solely the resources of extensional and composi-
tional logic: that is, logic that is restricted to the material condi-
tional and other extensional connectives. This is a logic ideally 
suited to a Humean metaphysics in which all is loose and separate. 
But because it deals only with the truth of propositions – with no 
stronger-than-contingent connections – such logics cannot express 
the kind of connectedness in which the dispositionalists believe. 
The logic has to be rejected, therefore. Logic has a metaphysical 
basis, as does everything else, and this means, among other things, 
that the tool of logic cannot be used in adjudicating between rival 
Humean and anti-Humean metaphysics. Classic logic, and any sys-
tem built upon it, will always favour Humeanism. 
 
 
9. Conclusion: the new programme 
 
It is a mark of a successful theory that it is able to unify and ex-
plain a range of different phenomena. The success of Lewis’s 
Humean Supervenience programme is in large part due to this. We 
might argue that it is due only to this, given the entire lack of em-
pirical evidence for the plurality of concrete other worlds, spatio-
temporally disconnected from our own. The prospects of disposi-
tionalism constituting an equally or even more powerful theory in 
due course are good, however, especially if all dispositionalists 
come to accept the special dispositional modality within the pow-
ers that be. And as we explained in Part One, we believe there is 
also empirical evidence that our world is one containing such pow-
ers. 
 
This suggests that a pre-analytic idea of power and its sui generis 
modality – scholastic notions – could get us out of a number of the 
dead ends of contemporary philosophy. In Part Two, we have been 
able to provide only indications and much detailed argument 
would have to follow. But given that to grasp its explanatory power 
we need to understand how broad is the range of issues with which 
the dispositional modality can help, we think it has been important 
to offer this overview. 
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